Opening new units is easy. Scaling a profitable model is the real challenge.
By Antoine Maccioni - Oct. 1, 2026
Opening new units is visible. Building a network that creates repeatable value is much harder.
I have contributed to network expansion through both organic growth and acquisition, across hypermarkets, proximity formats, specialist retail and distribution counters, in very different markets.
The formats were different. The geographies were different. The economics were different.
But one lesson has remained remarkably consistent:
Opening is rarely the hardest part.
The real challenge starts after the decision to expand has been made.
Can the format travel?
Can the unit economics survive outside the first successful locations?
Can the supply chain absorb more volume without losing service or efficiency?
Can the organization recruit, train and develop enough capable people?
Can technology, processes and reporting support a larger network without creating friction?
Can the customer proposition remain clear as the footprint grows?
And if expansion comes through acquisition, can the acquired network be integrated without destroying the very value that justified the deal?
This is why I have become increasingly cautious about celebrating expansion through opening numbers alone.
A larger network is not automatically a stronger network.
In my experience, the real test is whether growth can be repeated without diluting economics, complexity, customer experience or execution quality.
That is the difference between opening units and building scale.
Expansion adds footprint. Scale reproduces performance.
Real estate is visible, tangible and easy to measure.
A site is identified. A lease is negotiated. A fit out starts. An opening date is set.
That can create the impression that expansion is primarily a location strategy.
In my experience, it is much broader than that.
A strong site can help a good format perform. But it cannot compensate for weak economics, poor replenishment, excessive labour, unclear assortment, fragile technology or a management model that does not travel well.
And the opposite is also true. A good operating model can still struggle if location decisions ignore how the network actually works.
This is why I have learned to look beyond the site itself.
The real questions are wider.
Does the catchment support the proposition?
Will the unit add profitable demand or simply cannibalise an existing one?
Can logistics serve it efficiently?
Can the right people be recruited locally?
Will the format still work with local rent, wage and customer economics?
Does the new unit strengthen the network, or just make it larger?
These questions become even more important once expansion accelerates.
The first few openings often receive disproportionate attention. Senior leaders are close to the detail. Problems are solved quickly. Exceptions are tolerated.
That can create a false sense of scalability.
The real test begins when the network starts growing faster than leadership can personally intervene.
At that point, what looked like a real estate decision becomes a test of the whole operating system.
That is why I do not think the right question is:
“Can we open here?”
The better question is:
“Can we operate here successfully, repeatedly and profitably?”
A site creates an opening. The operating model determines whether it deserves to stay open.
Expansion is attractive because growth is visible.
New openings create momentum. Revenue rises. The footprint gets bigger. The organization feels as though it is moving forward.
But the number of openings tells you very little about the quality of the growth.
In my experience, the real discipline starts with unit economics.
What should a mature unit generate in sales?
What gross margin can it sustain?
What level of labour is required?
What occupancy cost is acceptable?
How much inventory and working capital does it need?
What is the logistics cost to serve it?
How long does it take to reach break even?
What is the payback on the capital invested?
These questions sound basic, but this is often where expansion plans become vulnerable.
A slightly optimistic sales ramp can make a site look attractive.
A slightly underestimated staffing requirement can materially change profitability.
A small increase in logistics cost can look insignificant at one unit and become very significant across twenty.
And a payback that stretches by six or twelve months may completely change the economics of the rollout.
That is why I have learned to be cautious when an expansion case depends too heavily on the best assumptions being right at the same time.
The model has to work under normal operating conditions, not only in the business case.
This is particularly important because the first few openings are rarely representative.
They often receive more management attention, stronger teams and faster support.
The real test is what happens when the model is repeated at pace.
If profitability depends on constant executive intervention, the unit economics are not yet truly scalable.
If the economics are weak at unit level, expansion does not fix the problem. It multiplies it.
I have worked with both organic expansion and acquisition, and they create very different management challenges.
Organic growth gives more control.
You choose the location, the format, the opening sequence, the team, the systems and the operating standards from the start.
That control is valuable.
But it also takes time.
You have to build the network, recruit people, create awareness, establish local routines and often develop the supply chain step by step.
Acquisition gives you something different.
Speed.
You can gain locations, customers, people and market presence much faster than through organic openings alone.
But speed comes with complexity.
You inherit systems.
You inherit ways of working.
You inherit local habits, leadership styles, cost structures and sometimes customer expectations that are different from your own.
This is why I have never considered acquisition to be simply a faster version of organic growth.
It is a different route to the same destination.
The destination is still a coherent, economically sound and scalable network.
That means integration cannot be treated as an administrative exercise.
You need to decide what should be preserved, what should be standardized and what should be changed quickly.
Move too slowly, and the network remains fragmented.
Move too fast, and you can destroy local strengths, lose people or disrupt customers.
That balance matters.
In my experience, the best integrations are clear on one point from the beginning:
What is non negotiable in the operating model, and where is local flexibility actually valuable?
Because the objective is not uniformity for its own sake.
The objective is to create a network that can operate with common standards, common economics and common accountability, while preserving what genuinely creates value locally.
Acquisition can accelerate footprint. Integration determines whether it accelerates value.
Location matters.
But in my experience, location alone is never enough.
A high traffic area can still be the wrong place for the format.
A cheaper location can still be expensive if the catchment does not generate the right customer missions.
And a strong site can still underperform if the network around it creates cannibalisation or logistics inefficiency.
This is why I have learned to look at the catchment much more broadly.
Who is the customer?
Why are they coming?
How often?
What are they buying?
How far are they willing to travel?
What alternatives already exist nearby?
What is the impact on neighbouring units?
Can the supply chain serve the location efficiently?
Does the density of the network improve economics, or create duplication?
These questions are particularly important in proximity formats, where the difference between a good and weak catchment can be very small in distance but very large in economics.
They also matter in larger formats, where a site can look attractive on a map but still struggle because access, traffic patterns, competitive intensity or customer habits do not support the proposition.
The point is simple.
Footfall is not the same as demand.
And demand is not the same as profitable demand.
The right location is not only where customers are.
It is where the proposition, the catchment, the network and the economics all reinforce each other.
A strong location brings customers in. Strong catchment economics determine whether the unit creates value.
Expansion plans are often built around commercial opportunity.
New markets. New catchments. More units. More revenue.
But in my experience, the supply chain is often where the model starts to reveal its limits.
A network can grow faster than the infrastructure supporting it.
Distribution centres reach capacity.
Replenishment frequency becomes harder to maintain.
Inventory accuracy deteriorates.
Delivery routes become inefficient.
Lead times stretch.
Local teams start compensating manually.
And suddenly, growth that looked attractive at unit level begins to create cost and complexity elsewhere in the system.
This is why supply chain readiness has to be considered before expansion accelerates, not after service levels begin to fall.
The questions are practical.
Can the current distribution network absorb the additional volume?
Does route density improve as the footprint grows?
Will new locations require a different delivery model?
Is inventory positioned correctly?
Can suppliers support the pace?
Are systems capable of managing a larger network with the same level of visibility and control?
And is the cost to serve still consistent with the original unit economics?
What I have learned is that network growth changes supply chain economics, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively.
More density can improve efficiency.
But more complexity can destroy it.
A strong expansion plan therefore does not only ask whether the next location can be opened.
It asks whether the entire supply chain can support the next twenty.
A network can only scale as fast as the supply chain behind it.
This is where expansion either becomes a system or remains a series of individual successes.
In my experience, the first openings often work because strong people are close to them.
Senior leaders are involved.
The best managers are selected.
Problems are solved quickly.
Standards are adapted on the spot.
That can create strong early results.
But it can also hide a weakness in the model.
If performance depends on exceptional people constantly fixing exceptions, the operating model is not yet scalable.
Before accelerating, I like to see whether the basics can be repeated consistently.
Are the operating routines clear?
Is the staffing model realistic?
Are productivity standards defined?
Is the layout efficient?
Are stock routines disciplined?
Are opening procedures understood?
Are responsibilities clear?
Can the same standards be executed by different teams in different locations without constant escalation?
This is where simple things matter enormously.
A good opening playbook.
Clear standard operating procedures.
Strong inventory discipline.
A predictable management cadence.
Consistent performance reviews.
Fast escalation when something breaks.
None of this is glamorous.
But this is often what determines whether a network can grow without losing control.
The real test is not whether one unit performs well.
It is whether the tenth, twentieth and fiftieth unit can perform well without requiring a heroic level of intervention.
If every opening needs heroes, the model is not scalable yet.
It is possible to open locations faster than you can build the leadership needed to run them well.
I have seen this become one of the most underestimated constraints in expansion.
Recruitment usually gets attention because it is visible.
Can we hire enough people?
Can we staff the opening?
But the deeper question is different.
Can we build enough capable managers to protect the model as the network grows?
A new unit needs more than headcount.
It needs leaders who understand the customer proposition, the operating standards, the economics and the culture.
That takes time.
And when growth accelerates, the temptation is often to promote too quickly, stretch strong managers across too many locations or rely on a small group of experienced people to stabilize every opening.
That can work for a while.
It rarely works indefinitely.
For me, the people plan has to move at the same pace as the expansion plan.
Recruitment, training, succession, onboarding, mobility and leadership development all matter.
Acquisition adds another layer, because the challenge is not only capability.
It is also integration.
Which leaders should stay?
Which practices should be preserved?
Where is alignment needed quickly?
And how do you bring people into a common operating model without losing local knowledge or creating unnecessary disruption?
A network ultimately scales through people before it scales through systems.
You can open units faster than you can build leaders. That gap eventually shows up in performance.
Technology is often treated as an enabler of expansion.
And it should be.
But I have also seen technology become one of the reasons expansion gets slower, more expensive or harder to control.
As the network grows, the technology stack has to support more locations, more users, more inventory, more transactions and more operational complexity without becoming fragile.
That means the basics matter.
POS.
ERP.
WMS.
Pricing.
Inventory management.
Workforce planning.
CRM.
Master data.
Reporting.
Cybersecurity.
Integration.
The issue is not whether every system is sophisticated.
The issue is whether the systems work together well enough to support the operating model.
This becomes even more critical after an acquisition.
The acquired network may run on different systems, different data structures and different reporting logic.
At that point, the temptation is either to standardize everything immediately or leave everything untouched for too long.
Both can create problems.
In my experience, the better approach starts with a simple question:
Which systems are critical to operating as one network, and which differences can be tolerated for a period of time?
Technology should help make the network easier to run, easier to measure and easier to scale.
If every new opening creates another workaround, another local interface or another reporting exception, the business is adding digital complexity alongside physical growth.
Technology should absorb complexity as the network grows, not create more of it.
Opening activity creates visibility.
A new location usually comes with launch plans, local communication, promotional support and an initial burst of attention.
That matters.
But in my experience, the real marketing challenge starts after opening day.
The question is not only how to attract customers once.
It is how to build a customer network that creates repeat demand.
That means understanding the local catchment, the customer missions, the role of digital, the importance of loyalty and how each location contributes to the broader brand proposition.
For proximity formats, local activation can make a major difference.
For larger formats, the challenge may be broader: awareness, destination relevance, frequency and retention.
In both cases, marketing has to do more than support the launch.
It has to make the proposition clear enough, relevant enough and distinctive enough for customers to come back.
I have seen openings generate strong initial traffic that later faded because the proposition itself was not strong enough to sustain demand.
That is why launch success should never be confused with customer adoption.
The best expansion models do not rely on permanent promotional intensity to keep new locations alive.
They create enough value in the proposition that customers have a reason to return, recommend and remain engaged over time.
Opening marketing creates attention. A strong customer proposition creates repeat demand.
Expansion creates momentum, and momentum can make challenge uncomfortable.
New units are opening. Revenue is growing. The network is expanding. The organisation feels positive.
That is exactly when Finance has to stay disciplined.
In my experience, the best expansion programmes are not the ones with the most optimistic business cases.
They are the ones where the economics continue to be challenged after the opening.
Capex.
Payback.
Working capital.
Ramp up.
Cannibalisation.
Labour productivity.
Occupancy.
Logistics cost.
Post investment performance.
These are not questions to ask only when the investment is approved.
They need to stay alive once the unit is trading.
I have seen how quickly a good opening story can hide a weaker economic reality.
Sales may be above plan, but margin below.
Revenue may be growing, but inventory and working capital may be absorbing too much cash.
A location may look successful in isolation while quietly taking demand from another part of the network.
This is why I believe every expansion programme needs strong post investment reviews.
Not to create bureaucracy.
To create learning.
Which assumptions were right?
Which were wrong?
What should change before the next wave?
And which locations should not be repeated?
Growth should be celebrated. Growth quality should be challenged.
Opening proves demand. Finance has to prove the value.
Ambition usually sets the pace of expansion.
Capability should set the limit.
That distinction matters.
In my experience, growth starts to become fragile when the opening plan moves faster than the organisation supporting it.
Operations become stretched.
Support functions start reacting rather than anticipating.
Recruitment quality drops.
Training gets compressed.
Technology fixes become temporary.
Supply chain capacity gets pushed closer to the edge.
And decisions that were once deliberate become rushed.
This is where governance matters.
Not governance for its own sake.
Governance that forces the business to prove readiness before moving to the next wave.
Are the locations ready?
Is the supply chain ready?
Are the people ready?
Are the systems stable?
Are the unit economics still holding?
Are previous openings performing as expected?
Has the organisation actually learned from the last wave?
These questions should sit together, not in separate functional reviews.
Because expansion is cross functional by nature.
Real estate cannot succeed without operations.
Operations cannot scale without people.
People cannot perform without systems.
Systems cannot compensate for weak economics.
And Finance cannot validate value if the operating model itself is not ready.
The pace of expansion should therefore reflect what the organisation can absorb without losing control.
That does not mean slowing down unnecessarily.
It means knowing when speed is creating advantage and when it is creating hidden risk.
The right pace of expansion is not the fastest one. It is the fastest one the organisation can absorb well.
By the time an expansion programme reaches scale, the question is no longer whether individual units can succeed.
The question is whether the system around them is strong enough to make success repeatable.
That means looking at the whole model together.
Are the economics still holding as the network grows?
Is the supply chain supporting the footprint without adding disproportionate cost?
Are new leaders being developed fast enough?
Are systems and processes becoming simpler, not more fragmented?
Is customer demand being built consistently?
Can Finance see clearly where value is being created and where it is being diluted?
And perhaps most importantly:
Can the network continue to perform without special treatment, constant exceptions or repeated executive intervention?
For me, that is the point where expansion becomes scale.
Not when the business has opened a certain number of units.
Not when the rollout plan has been completed.
But when the model can reproduce performance consistently across different locations, teams and markets.
That is the real proof that the organisation has built a capability, rather than simply executed a series of openings.
Scale begins when performance no longer depends on special conditions.
Before approving the next wave of openings, take the expansion plan and test it against the whole operating model.
Not only the sites.
Not only the capex.
Not only the revenue ambition.
Ask:
Are the unit economics proven?
Can the supply chain absorb the next wave?
Do we have enough capable leaders to run the additional units?
Are the systems ready to support a larger network?
Is the customer proposition strong enough to generate repeat demand?
Can Operations reproduce the model without exceptional intervention?
Has Finance validated the economics after the last wave, not only before it?
And if we acquired part of the network, are we genuinely integrating it or simply adding complexity?
Then force one final question:
What would break first if we doubled the pace of expansion?
That answer is often more useful than the opening plan itself.
Because it exposes the real constraint.
And once you know the constraint, you can decide whether to fix it, slow down, change the model or stop.
"Do not ask only how fast you can expand. Ask what will break first when you do".